Contested enclave metageographies: The offshore islands of Taiwan

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A B S T R A C T
The offshore islands of Taiwan (Republic of China) are dynamic examples of contested metageographies, island spaces caught in between competing and opposing interpretations of their identities, relativities, notions of sustainability and futures. Three cases – (1) population growth, land use conflict, a switch from a military to a tourism economy, and ever closer links between mainland China and Kinmen Island; (2) the rejection of a move to establish a casino economy on the Penghu archipelago; and (3) protests against the storage of spent nuclear waste on Orchid Island — are presented as illustrative of such changing topographies, themselves reflective of a transition to a more democratic and pluralist society in Taiwan. The paper hints at an evolving shift in both vertical (top/down) and horizontal (island-to-island) relations in the construction of development paths and futures for Taiwan’s de facto archipelago. This reterritorialization offers a fresh, archipelagic repivoting of political geography for and beyond Taiwan.

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Introduction
“What the map cuts up, the story cuts across” (de Certeau, 1988, p. 129).

The anomalous political status of Taiwan/Republic of China, and its relationship with the People’s Republic of China is a subject of keen interest in various jurisdictions that are, or include, archipelagos (Baldacchino, 2012) — is that ‘Taiwan’ is more than just the one main island that bears this name; this island does not constitute “the sum total” of the polity’s territory since 1949 (Berry & Lu, 2005, p. 3). Rather, Taiwan (the main island) is engaged in a domestic relationship with a series of offshore islands; these extend to the coastal zone of mainland China, to the Diaoyutai islands in the East China Sea (a claim disputed by Japan, which calls them the Senkaku islands); and as far as Taipin (or Itu Aba) Island, the largest member of the Spratly island chain, in the South China Sea (a claim also disputed, this time by no less than six regional powers). All together, some 121 islands form the archipelago that comprises the current jurisdiction of Taiwan (see Table 1).

Taiwan’s offshore islands are lessons in diversity: of size, population, remoteness, history, natural beauty, indigenous people and touristic appeal. Within this diversity lurk competing notions and presumptions of how these islands could and should develop, what functions they could and should serve, and for whom.

Since the late 1940s, the de facto national government of Taiwan in Taipei has peddled its own interpretation of the islands’ function/s within the overall national imaginary: these include military outposts, high security prisons, waste disposal sites, fishing grounds, tourism sites, nature parks, and cultural reserves for indigenous people and their customs. Since 2000, this central government has also tended to drive forward a model of island development that has focused largely on projects to promote infrastructural self-sufficiency; and, more recently, on an interpretation of sustainable development that privileges protection and conservation, ensures the overall welfare and quality of life of islanders, and promotes tourism appeal.

Local interests however, have not always embraced these representations. In some cases, the transition-in-progress implicit in these projections dovetails with local islanders’ aspirations; such as for peaceful co-existence and economic development (on Kinmen Island); though concerns relating to the consequences of mass tourism may be on their way. Meanwhile, other state-driven conceptualizations of what should be the role of Taiwan’s offshore islands have been questioned, challenged and opposed. In a couple
of high profile instances, locals have rejected initiatives to establish a casino economy (on Penghu); and strongly protested against the storage of spent nuclear waste (on Orchid Island).

**This paper**

This paper describes the competing island topographies involved in these disputes. We present a set of contested island imaginaries, focussing on the extensive archipelago that makes up the jurisdiction of Taiwan. The history of these offshore islands as components of Taiwan has been relatively short and recent: Taiwan is a jurisdiction emerging from a devastating civil war in the late 1940s, and a leading member of the so-called four Asian Tigers or ‘Little Dragons’ (Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, Watts, & Whatmore, 2009, p. 38; Vogel, 1991). Its various islands are, and have been, platforms for the unfolding of differing and contrasting interpretations (as much as of anxieties) of identity, positioning and geo-politics. The transformation of the incorporation of small islands into the national psyche and imaginary of Taiwan is a result of a democratic transition, as well as of a stronger voice and presence of islander voices at the negotiating and visioning table. In this way, we reterritorialize and pivot Taiwan archipelagically, presenting it in contra-distinguishing to other dominant representations of this same jurisdiction: particularly from Beijing/People’s Republic of China (PRC), and from Taipei/Republic of China (ROC) itself. What unfolds is an exercise in the mechanics and dynamics of mapping that aligns with the topography of (in this case, de facto) state formation and evolution; a rich territorialization that unfolds in relation to changing conceptualizations and manifestations of a national space that is both material and affective (Brighenti, 2010a, 2010b).

Of course, we admit and acknowledge that this revisioning exercise flies in the face of Beijing’s and Taipei’s own official interpretations of their territorial claims. And it is perhaps for such reasons that the current de facto operation of Taiwan as an archipelagic jurisdiction remains under-acknowledged. And yet, unfolding domestic politics are raising questions of island governance and exacerbating this archipelagic ‘turn’: the islands of, and off, Taiwan are promoting, and being promoted as, self-evident topos of geographical plurality. In any case, the 1991 amendments to the Constitution of the Republic of China can be seen to imply that its current jurisdiction is equivalent to the island of Taiwan and its offshore islands (Chow, 2007, p. 107; Taiwan Constitution, 2013). Since then, there have been moves to implicitly recognize the nature of the island state and to specifically promote the welfare of residents of its offshore small islands, particularly via the Offshore Islands Development Act of 2000 (ODIA, 2009). Furthermore, the claiming of Taiwan as an ‘Ocean Country’ is mentioned in the Ocean Policy White Paper of 2006 (RDEC, 2006).

To make and sustain such an argument, this paper is organized as follows. We first situate our concern within the burgeoning literature on islands as enclaves or excised sites of jurisdiction, suggesting that islands are more pliable spaces with(in) which to practise inbordering, carving out or reconfiguring specific economic, environmental or military functions that need not, and should not, spill over elsewhere. We also explain why we have chosen Taiwan to ground and flesh out our concerns; and to support our case graphically with what we consider to be a more suitably archipelagic map of Taiwan. Next, we offer a brief twentieth-century history of Taiwan that privileges the changing use values of outlying islands in the context of the unfolding of relations between ROC and PRC. This is the lead-up to a review of three case studies from three of these island groups – Kinmen, Penghu and Orchid – that illustrate an emerging pluralism in Taiwanese politics whereby different and multiple interpretations of island identities are now being articulated, championed and/or resisted, and invoking scenarios quite different from a judicious offshoring meant to keep risky, undesirable or suspicious elements at bay. Case studies from different island groups, such as the Diaoyutai (the Senkaku) and Taipin Island (Itu Aba) – very much in the news in recent months (Corcuff, 2013; Ogden, 2013) – would have offered material for other spatial imaginaries; but such an analysis will have to wait for a separate paper.

This re-imagining of Taiwan as archipelago is thus a reflection of unfolding power relations within Taiwan itself. We discuss the implications of these observations, with respect to both the current governance of Taiwan and its possible futures when reframed archipelagically.

### Islands fit the bill

“Islands … bounded but porous; isolated, connected, colonized, postcolonial; redolent of the performative imaginary; vulnerable to linguistic, cultural, environmental change; robust and able to absorb and modify … utopian and dystopian, tourist meccas, ecological refugia” (Stratford, 2003, p. 495).

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**Table 1**

Basic data on Taiwan’s offshore islands (updated: February 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of island group</th>
<th>No. of islands in group</th>
<th>Relative location</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Closest distance to main island (km)</th>
<th>Largest island (sq km)</th>
<th>Total area of island group (sq km)</th>
<th>Population (2013)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinmen</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Xiamen Bay, Mainland China</td>
<td>Kinmen, Fuchien Province</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>120,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matsu</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Northern Fujian, Mainland China</td>
<td>Lien-Chiang, Fuchien Province</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>11,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penghu</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Taiwan Strait</td>
<td>Penghu</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>98,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Island</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Eastern Taiwan</td>
<td>Taitung</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchid Island</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>South-Eastern Taiwan</td>
<td>Taitung</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4905/4194</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liuchiu Island</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>South-Western Taiwan</td>
<td>Pintung</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12,415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turtle Island</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>North-Eastern Taiwan</td>
<td>Ilan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Military post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keelung Islands</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>North to Keelung</td>
<td>Keelung</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaoyutai Islands</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>East China Sea</td>
<td>Ilan</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pratas Islands</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td>Kaoshiung City</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Military post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiping Island</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Spratly Group, South China Sea</td>
<td>Dept of Defence</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>Military post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>121</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>387.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 0 Islands in all, if very small islets are included.
* Indigenous population on island.

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Metageography refers to “the set of spatial structures through which people order their knowledge of the world: the often unconscious frameworks that organize studies of history, sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, or even natural history” (Lewis & Wigen, 1997, p. ix). Taylor (2001, p. 114) adds development studies and international relations to this listing. The term reminds us that places are not things; they are not objective specificities whose existence usurps and transcends time, context and focus. Instead, geographies are socially constructed, often serving ideological or imperial purposes; their implicit materiality, fixity and ‘national unity’ are constructs that conceal other forces and interests at work. Hence, there is a sheer impossibility of discussing factual statements without the accompanying interlacing of myths and metaphors. Moreover, the raw power of the political map in shaping our views of the world is so great that metageographical understandings in the contemporary era are often rooted in the map of ‘sovereign’ states, even if and when the frame of reference lies beyond the realm of political practice (Agnew, 1994; Sidaway, 2007b). Indeed, the very idea of a “territorial state as a unified, bounded, homogeneous and naturally occurring entity” can itself be traced to cartographic origins (Steinberg, 2005, p. 253). The South China Sea is a region where such mapping, counter-mapping and counter-naming, are now all the rage. Since 2011, some prefer to call this region the ‘West Philippine Sea’ (The Economist, 2012); although Taiwan was quick to reject this renaming, and reiterated its claim to sovereignty over the area (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC [Taiwan], 2011, 2012). Different countries have staked different claims; but the PRC has been making the most assertive and vociferous moves, both militarily and representationally. In spite of their differences, the PRC and the ROC share common positions on their claims to the various islands in this region (Che, 2013).

Given their alluringly simple and self-evident boundedness, islands are assemblages that are much disposed to this territorializing exercise. Indeed, the representation and framing of islands as distinct spaces — and often distinct polities or jurisdictions — creates a disposition for differentiated control and socio-political engineering that departs from the norm: a practice that can be traced back to the development of quarantine islands in Venice and Genoa in the 14th century. In line with various creation myths, islands have definitively shifted “from the register of the ‘found’ to the register of the ‘made’” (Sidaway, 2007a, p. 352). This has identified a wider tendency in contemporary times on the part of governments to condone, or even instigate, a progressively more variegated zonal capitalism, or a “complex and uneven experience of selective boundary crossings, subjectivities and exclusions”. This is a practice of excision that, for islands, has taken the meaning of offshore to a completely new level (Agamben, 2005; Palan, 2003). Some islands can also be bought, leased or sold: a new experience of selective boundary crossings, subjectivities and exclusions.

Justifications

We choose to flesh out these anxieties in relation to the islands of Taiwan, for a variety of interlocking reasons. First, the uniquely problematic status of Taiwan/Republic of China (henceforth, Taiwan) since 1949 is a focus of considerable regional and international scholarship (Kastner, 2009). The Communist Party that rules the Chinese mainland and the Nationalist Party (KMT) that has dominated Taiwanese politics has a long-standing quarrel whose parameters have changed with time. Initially, the Republic of China was the original government established since 1911; but a civil war broke out between two regimes each of which wanted to govern all of China: after the founding of the PRC (with Mao Tsetung at its helm) in 1949, and the relocation of the (former) Government of China (with Chiang Kai-Shek in charge) to Taiwan, this struggle had some violent episodes (more below); but increasingly took on the hues of what has been described as ‘chequebook diplomacy’, with each side seeking to muster exclusive recognition as the single, legitimate government of China from the international community (Madsen, 2001; McElyoe & Bai, 2008). The contemporary phase is more conciliatory; the PRC has proposed Taiwan as a ‘special administrative region’, a status similar to that of Hong Kong; but Taiwan has rejected this suggestion (Cooper, 1995, pp. 93—124). But, meanwhile, both sides have made a series of positive, incremental steps to facilitate bilateral trade, tourism, transportation and “geo-economic integration” (Lim, 2012). This ongoing focus on the Beijing-Taipei nexus has tended to dampen or deflect interest in this other political geography, that of Taiwan’s internal island space.

Second, for many years, Taiwan’s central government in Taipei has been largely dictating the development of some of its islands unilaterally, invoking strategy and martial law (Szonyi, 2008, p. 9); this has dampened or subded the generation of counter-representations at the local level. More recently, however, a thaw in relations across the Taiwan Strait (see more below) has created geostrategic military bases, remote weapons test and dump sites, special autonomous regions, duty-free zones, heritage and conservation parks, spaces without right of abode, and various combinations of the above (Baldacchino, 2010a, p. 191). Though they may wish to, states rarely act unilaterally in the process of such a re-territorialization: there are competing versions and interpretations, utopias and dystopias, of the ways in which islands are re/presented and imagined; and there are different capacities available to the different players — including islanders — that can help to consolidate, tweak or fray the dominance of any particular representation/s over others. Islands are “anxious spaces” (Jackson & Della Dora, 2009) that play out competing metageographies, even as these representations are performed as factual pronouncements, brands, visioning statements or ‘natural’ attributes.

Like many other countries in East and South Asia, Taiwan is not exempt from having to deal with its own set of contested islands. However, these are commonly understood as island spaces that are claimed by more than one jurisdiction. In Taiwan’s case, it claims the Diaoyutai, eight small volcanic islets in the East China Sea; they are called Senkaku by the Japanese, who claim them as their own and effectively control them (McCormack, 2011). Meanwhile, Taiping Island, within the Spratly island group, is the site of a Taiwanese naval garrison; there are, however, no less than six countries with territorial claims over the Spratly island group (Womack, 2011). Islands are iconic spaces for the pursuit of nationalist agendas; and though they may be small, their possession implies control over vast expanses of ocean and marine resources (Anderson, 1993).
opportunities for more democratic policy contestation and an increasing plurality of opinions and representations, which deserve their own recognition and critique.

Third, much of the scholarship that has focused on Taiwan’s offshore islands is concerned with the protection of biodiversity, cultural heritage, or the promotion of tourism; and it is only of late that dialogue is underway to plan sustainable development trajectories that serve resident needs and go beyond promoting construction projects or strict conservation practices. This dialogue is bound to trigger a wider plurality of vision for the offshore islands’ futures.

We contend that such an archipelagic sensibility with regards to Taiwan is a useful technique for highlighting how the different jurisdictional powers wielded by the varied island communities contours the manufacturing of island representations. This analysis therefore hopes to offer a more nuanced understanding of the problematic associated with archipelagos; one that includes considerations of peer-to-peer, island—island connectivities.

Islands of diversity

“Other discoveries await on the outlying islands of Taiwan, from the distinctive terrain of the Penghu Islands to the sea-eroded rock formations and eastern Fujian culture and stone houses on Matsu in the Taiwan Strait, to the natural beauty of the remote Orchid Island and Green Island in the southeast Pacific” (Taiwan Tourism Bureau, 2011a).

Straddling the Tropic of Cancer, right on the fault line where the Euro-Asian and Philippine continental plates meet, Taiwan enjoys an extremely diversified topography and natural environment. This endowment is also shared by Taiwan’s various offshore islands, classified into 11 distinct groups. There are granite-origin continental islands, close to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) southeast coastline, such as Kinmen and Matsu island groups; mid-ocean archipelagos, like the Penghu group; volcanic oceanic islands, such as Green Island, Orchid Island and Turtle Island; and islands on raised coral reefs or atolls, such as Little Liuchiu Island (Liuchiuju) and Pratas (Tsai, 2002, pp. 397–402). These islands are presented in the tourism literature as each being able to offer a distinct location, topographical characteristics and (where inhabited) human activities; each has its own unique scenery, geology, biogeography and culture. Thus, each island can offer something different, “satisfying the various needs of visitors, whether these have a natural, historical or cultural nature, or simply consist of sightseeing, snorkelling or sport fishing” (Taiwan Tourism Bureau, 2011b).

Taiwan’s offshore islands have only been lumped together within the same ‘state’ boundary after 1945 (end of World War II), and following the establishment of an ROC government in Taipei in 1949, after the communist victory in mainland China. Thereafter, relations between Taiwan and mainland China have been tense. Although ‘the Taiwan Question’ (Hamrin & Wang, 2004) is currently subdued, both Beijing and Taipei have considered military intervention to force the impasse. Unlike the ROC, the PRC has not committed to abandoning the use of force on the issue. In such a scenario, martial law was imposed on all Taiwan’s coastlines and offshore islands; for decades, the livelihoods of the residents of Taiwan’s inhabited islands have depended largely on fishing, agriculture and military spending.

Martial law was lifted from most of the offshore islands in 1987; and then from both island groups of Kinmen (officially, Kinmen county of Fujian province, ROC) and Matsu (Lien-chiang county of Fujian province, ROC) in 1992. This decision increased public access to coastal and insular areas, at the same time that significant economic growth in Taiwan was creating a public increasingly able to afford, and interested in, outdoor recreation and vacationing. This situation ushered in a change in the representation of the Taiwanese offshore space from military frontier to tourism playgrounds, biogeographically and culturally rich environments. The Penghu archipelago (or Pescadores) – officially, Penghu county of Taiwan province, ROC – was the target of an early proposal for development as a national scenic area, meant to maintain a balance between preservation and tourism utilization, and launched in 1991 (Ni & Chang, 2006: 6). Green Island’s marine recreational national scenic area followed in 1990; as did the ones on Little Liuchiu Island in 1990 (as part of a larger Tapeng Bay national scenic area, and connected to Taiwan southwest coastal zone in 2000), and on Matsu in 1999. Part of Kinmen was designated a national park in 1995. Green Island, which had served as a site of exile for political prisoners during the martial law period of Taiwanese history, and which had held some of Taiwan’s most dangerous criminals, has seen its prison facilities converted into the Green Island Human Rights Memorial Park in 1999. Pratas Atoll (or Dongsha) was designated as part of Taiwan’s first marine national park in 2007. Coastal areas in particular have undergone a sudden and radical reversal of fortune: from ‘no-go’ zones to popular ‘sun, sea and sand’ tourism destinations. The final stage of this transition to the peaceful use of island spaces, and the incorporation of dark histories into cultural products, was achieved in June 2013 when the last outstanding landmines in the Kinmen island group were cleared (The China Post, 2013).

Emergent in this context are some local ‘products’ that have come to strongly represent what some of these offshore islands stand for. Such ‘brands’ stand alone but also ride on the presumed allure of the particular island on which they are located, and its own ‘place branding’ campaigns (Anholt, 2006; Baldacchino, 2010b), with which they are intimately associated. Liquor, known as kao-liang, is now a powerful brand in its own right. It is made from sorghum: originally introduced as a drought-resistant grain in 1952 to swap with imported rice from mainland Taiwan under a crop-exchange policy, sorghum also provided a local solution to the drinking needs of thousands of soldiers stationed on Kinmen and Matsu (Szonji, 2008, pp. 128–129; Tsai, 2003, p. 215; Zhang, 2010b). The lucrative industries are owned by the respective county governments and provide considerable operating revenue to the two county administrations. Both island groups have also become living museums of “traditional Fujian architecture as well as western-continental hybrid architectural styles created by returned overseas Chinese” (Szonji, 2008, p. 209). Cleavers made from the stainless steel cases of spent bomb cartridges, and peanut candy (both private business initiatives), make for other notable Kinmen souvenirs (Zhang, 2010a, 2010b). In Penghu, the special basalt geological formation and traditional co-evolved techniques on fishing and farming (including stone weirs and stone-walled gardens) serve as educational and tourist allure (F. L. Tsai, 2009; H.-M. 2005); recent plans speak of a strong investment in wind energy to bolster the islands’ economic fortunes (Chang, 2011; Taipei Times, 2012a).

The development trajectory of Taiwan’s inhabited offshore islands started receiving specific and non-security driven policy attention in the 1990s as targets of tourism development or conservation efforts. In 2000, with the enactment of the Offshore Islands Development Act, construction and industry, environmental assets, cultural characteristics and the general quality of life started being promoted via an Offshore Island Development Fund (Jou & Tsai, 2000). However, the focus gravitated to infrastructure projects, and saturation levels on various small islands were soon reached: “unnecessary constructions began to impact [upon] the
fragile ecologies while essential welfare services remained unimproved” (Liu, 2007, p. 2). To rectify this, legislation was amended (in 2001, and again in 2005) to ensure that development schemes would be submitted by the islands’ own administrations, and with due consideration towards sustainable practices, rather than driven unilaterally from or by Taipei (CEPD, 2003; Jou & Tsai, 2000; Royle & Tsai, 2008).

Meanwhile, the situation in Taiwan’s uninhabited islands is different. Although the strained relations between the ROC and PRC have eased in recent years, the government in Taipei has maintained a defence-driven approach in regard to most of its offshore, uninhabited island spaces. While these uninhabited islands are now largely protected from ‘development’ by legislation, and should “as much as possible be listed as protected areas” avoiding the excessive exploitation of local natural resources (Council for Economic Planning and Development, 2005: Section III, Article 2), they are also considered to be suitable platforms for “necessary” exclusive military, meteorological, navigation and other technical purposes: serving mainly as scientific stations and military outposts (Council for Economic Planning and Development, 2005: Section III, Article 2). Lesser Orchid Island was subjected to target practice by military aircraft during 1984—1994; this practice has now been stopped, perhaps instigated by public protests. Within the Matsu group, “the secretive military-controlled islands of Gaodeng and Liang are closed to the public” (The Best of Matsu, 2010, p. 5). Taiwan also keeps combat-ready marines on both Pratas Atoll and Taiping Island, in support of its sovereignty claims in this disputed region (Chuang, 2011).

Contested representations: a visual conundrum

Taiwan’s islands have thus been the peripheral, remote targets and beneficiaries of investment from a paternalist state. But the situation has been changing: with a growing sense of democratization and various measures of pro-growth economic liberalization in Taiwan, especially since the 1990s (Hsu, 2009; Rigger, 2011), local citizens and civil society increasingly can, and do, challenge the initiatives and visions of the Taiwan government, and — with specific reference to the thrust of this paper — the Taiwanese government’s intent with regards the functions and roles to be performed by the offshore islands within its purview.

At this point, we wanted to present a visual configuration of this change with an appropriate map. But here, what was initially a casual search became problematic: we were first confounded and then disturbed by what offerings were available. Few maps present the whole extent of Taiwan’s jurisdictional reach, and this is not just because of the dispersed location of its offshore islands. Most maps in the public domain, as well as via Google Images™, show Taiwan’s ‘main island’ standing in the centre, with most of the offshore small islands out of the frame completely, or with some included as an inset; unless the map focuses deliberately on a particular island or island group. We should not have been surprised that our critique of a Taipei-led Taiwanese development programme was fully matched and served by the visual renderings and subtle bias of that country’s maps. After all, maps (like histories) “name, order, and confer meanings to space” (Okihiro, 2010, p. 745). We therefore could not present an image of the offshore islands of Taiwan as a cluster of small dots surrounding a much larger, central, Taiwanese mainland; indeed, this was the best that we could find. We were thus obliged to reflect on developing our own, alternative map, one that would lie in a specific way, and ‘walk the talk’ of our argument. Maps construct, speak and legitimize extant power relations. Hence Map 1, adapted from Google Earth™, that accompanies this paper. It adopts a general ENE–WSW orientation. What we especially like about it is that: (1) it shows the locations of all the offshore islands of (or claimed by) Taiwan (and without resorting to insets), and including those islands in East China Sea and South China Sea; (2) it reminds us that the main island of Taiwan is just one other island in the North-West Pacific (in fact, at 35,806 km², it is slightly larger than Hainan and its 33,210 km²); and (3) it presents the whole sprawling Taiwan archipelago as overshadowed by the size and vicinity of the People’s Republic of China (but itself constitutionally part of the ROC).

Three episodes

Since the 1990s, there is growing evidence in Taiwan of confrontation, competition and negotiation of visions and representations of the future by local interests, even if this appears to be primarily a movement that blocks initiatives (rather than one that proposes them). Two episodes that relate to the offshore islands stand out in recent Taiwanese history as exemplary of such blocking manoeuvres: the disposal of nuclear waste on Orchid Island/Pongso

Map 1. A different map of Taiwan, sensitive to its de facto archipelagic character.
no Ta’u; and the rejection of a proposal to build and operate a casino on Penghu. A third episode, still brewing, relates to the very rapid change in the designation of Kinmen from frontline military zone to a tourism destination and gateway to mainland China. These three examples are emblematic indicators of a de facto “spatial turn” (Hess-Lüttich, 2012) in Taiwanese politics and identity, demonstrative of how acts of inbordering and enclaving of domestic space are no longer uncompromisingly top-down, driven by and from Taipei.

Case 1 — living in between on Kinmen

Kinmen (which means golden gate; also known in the local dialect as Quemoy) is an island chain with a resident population of around 120,000 (Kinmen County Government, 2013) and a total land area of just 150 km². Their livelihood has historically depended largely on fishing and on the remittances of migrants who had found employment elsewhere in the region, particularly Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries. But Kinmen’s very particular location assumed significant strategic importance after 1949: some of its islands are located less than 1 km from the territory of the PRC, while lying more than 200 km from its other ‘mainland’, Taiwan.

The ROC initially saw Kinmen as the launching pad for the invasion and resumption of its control over mainland China. But the Maoist regime targeted it as the obvious stepping stone for an eventual full-scale invasion of Taiwan. The island was the site of a historic battle of Kunington in 25–27 October 1949, a botched invasion that halted the Communist advance. Kinmen was then heavily bombed by the PRC for 44 days in 1958; and propaganda bombs rained pro-communist leaflets down on its inhabitants every other night for the next 20 years. As tense frontier sites between the ‘free world’ and the communist regime during the Cold War (Myers, 1996), the Kinmen islands (along with the Matsu islands, further up the Fujian coast), were significantly militarized. At one point, some 100,000 Taiwanese soldiers were stationed there. Most of the land and coastal areas became tightly controlled, with limited access even to resident civilians. Considerable state funds were injected for geopolitical purposes, including the ability to survive a long blockade. Thus, strictly regulated efforts got underway to promote reforestation, ensure an adequate water supply, boost agricultural and pastoral land to secure food self-sufficiency, and introduce drought-resistant sorghum for the mass production of liquor (kaoliang) for export as a source of income (Tsai, 2003, pp. 212–215; Clark & Tsai, 2005, pp. 159–160).

Cross-strait relations have however markedly improved in recent years; and Kinmen has transitioned “from battlefield to cross-strait bridge” (Taiwan Today, 2011a). Even in tenser times, Kinmen served as an unofficial meeting point, a ‘no man’s land’, where either party feels comfortable to meet discreetly and discuss issues of common concern (Huang, 2004). Kinmen was the site of the first cross-strait meeting in four decades to discuss humanitarian assistance in 1990, as well as to handle the return of illegal immigrants from mainland China (Mainland Affairs Council, 2009); it was part of the ‘mini three-links’ framework, established in 2001, which permitted limited postal, transport and cross-border trade between several port cities in China’s Fujian province, and Taiwan-held islands (including Matsu). On February 10, 2002 (two days before the Chinese New Year), for the first time in 53 years, Taiwanese businesspersons with Kinmen residential status could start travelling between mainland China and Taiwan via Xiamen harbour and Kinmen (rather than the lengthy detour via Hong Kong) (Clark & Tsai, 2002). It is now catering to mainland Chinese tourists “by converting military facilities into tourist traps and building museums with wartime themes” (Jennings, 2007). Its association with military episodes has fuelled the development of “battlefield tourism” supported by both state initiative and petty entrepreneurship (Szonyi, 2008; Zhang, 2010a, 2010b). Within a flourishing cultural industry, spent steel bomb casings are literally transformed into souvenir cutting knives (Yang & Hsing, 2001). Kinmen is now also a designated “duty-free island for luxury goods”, with stores for cosmetics, cigarettes, handbags and wine (Taiwan Today, 2011a). Along with its traditional Fujian style, red brick architecture and the abundant wild life in its nature reserves, the islands are proving a significant tourist attraction: PRC tourists have been “… keen to explore this ‘mysterious military bastion’ that the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] surprisingly failed to capture” (Zhang, 2010a, p. 413).

In spite of all this re-connecting and development, there are some evident tensions, some of which are typical of small islands witnessing large increases in tourist numbers. The population density is high and getting higher; population records show a staggering increase from 47,339 in 1995 to around 120,000 in 2013 – with a rapidly increasing population lured by lower taxes, attractive welfare benefits and economic prospects (The China Post, 2009a). Land is scarce, and arable and habitable land is even scarcer given the designated nature reserves. As the Taiwanese military continues its landmine-clearing operations along Kinmen’s coasts, some 154 ha of land currently within Kinmen National Park will be released from military safety restrictions. The local residents are calling for the land to be made available to them, claiming that it once belonged to their ancestors (Taipei Times, 2010a). But an even more serious issue may be round the corner.

In January 2011, Kinmen’s bridging qualities assumed a more permanent, physical character: preliminary work started on a 5.4 km bridge linking Kinmen to Leiyu, or Little Kinmen Island (8000 residents and a land area of 14 km²). The proposal for such a bridge was first put forward in 1993 by the Kinmen County Council. The bridge is reportedly in its “final design stage” (Chen, Yang, Kuo, & Hwung, 2012, p. 1). After this bridge’s completion, expected in 2016, there are rumbles that a second bridge may be considered, this time linking Kinmen to nearby Xiamen and the PRC; three routings for such a structure have been submitted, and the CEPD has already been exploring its feasibility (Taipei Times, 2009a, 2009b). Local government officials said the construction of the first bridge would make a bridge between Little Kinmen and Xiamen “more feasible” (Connan, 2011). Other than a burden to taxpayers, however, such a fixed link may significantly increase tourist traffic to the Kinmen island group, leading the islands down a path of mass tourism and property inflation, as has occurred in other cases (Baldacchino, 2007). True: the initiative “would be the most potent symbol of reconciliation between the former enemies across the Taiwan Strait yet”; but, would it be a “bridge too far” (Li, 2009)?

Case 2: the nuclear waste dump on Orchid Island

The ongoing saga surrounding the nuclear waste dumpsite on Orchid Island (or Lanyu) has been described as a study in “environmental colonialism” (Marsh, Lin, & Lin, 1993). The episode has thrust Taiwan into debates about environmental justice and the viability of a nuclear energy policy (Fan, 2006). It has also highlighted the growing political clout of indigenous nations, as Taiwan moves further away from a top-down state and towards the incorporation of indigenous movements, along with other vital elements of civil society, within the democratic process (Hsiao & Ho, 2010; Simon, 2010).

Taiwanese low-level nuclear waste from Taiwan’s three nuclear power plants operated by state-owned Taipower, has been, since 1982, ‘temporarily’ stored on Orchid Island, the homeland of the indigenous Tau (or Yami). An anti-nuclear waste movement, led by
the native Tau islanders, mobilized in October 1987, when news about the planned expansion of the waste storage site was leaked to the public. The movement gained nationwide visibility in February 1988 when Syaman Rapongan (a Tau activist and writer) and Kuo Jian-ping (Tau name: Syaman Funggay, a Presbyterian missionary), with the support of the islanders and anti-nuclear groups, led demonstrations in Taipei, capturing the attention of the media and of a public largely unaware that any such dumping was going on. In 1991, during another round of nationwide protests, these two young men handed a letter to Taipower, making three demands: a stop to a planned expansion of the waste site; the immediate stoppage of all nuclear shipments to Orchid Island; and the complete shutdown of the storage site (Kuan, 2007; Marsh et al., 1993; Syaman Rapongan, 2002). The first two requests have been complied with – the stoppage of more waste shipments to the island only stopped in 1996, after even more protests – but the third demand has proved elusive (Taipei Times, 2003). Seeking a permanent site for nuclear waste disposal remains uncertain: the Taiwanese government has been considering various options, including North Korea and the Solomon Islands (Gyorgy, 1997; Space Daily, 2002), but also Wuqiu Island in Kinmen county (Focus Taiwan, 2013). Taipower’s failure to stick to its promise of removal of the waste from Orchid Island by 2002 – and now extended to at least 2016 – has led to the regular articulation of grievances among the tribe, supported by a broad ‘green’ alliance (Taiwan Times, 2013). The Tau also allege bullying and willful deceit by the Taipei government (back in 1982, the local district commissioner was deceived into thinking that what the Taiwan government wanted to build on Orchid Island was just a fish cannery), a profound disrespect for their ancestral home, and serious health issues from an invisible threat (deformed fish have been caught in their fishing grounds, close to the disposal site).

Indeed, a full-scale cultural revival was launched alongside the anti-nuclear movement. There are various indigenous tribes in Taiwan, whose culture and history has experienced a strong connection with Pacific islands; but none perhaps more so than the Tau on Orchid Island, whose relative peripherality has protected them from Sinicization. They are “among Taiwan’s remaining two percent Austronesians in a sea of Han Chinese” (Arrigo, Huang, & Chung, 2010, np). The indigenous Tau remain the large majority of residents on Orchid Island which they call Pongso no fiu (the island of the Tau people). For decades, Orchid Island (like Green Island) was, in the sight of Taipei, more of a Taitung county backwater, occupied by a ‘primitive’ ethnic group. But the increasing local and international recognition of the rights of indigenous people brought with it a better inter-cultural understanding and an improved self-identity (Liu, 2007). In 2011, in celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Republic of China, si mangavang (the traditional, hand-made grand plank-boat with 18 rowers), crossed some 800 km of ocean, from Orchid Island to Taipei: a manifestation of pride in the Tau’s millenarian ocean culture (Hou, 2011).

Case 3: casino tourism on Penghu

Gambling is banned in Taiwan, but proposals to legalize casinos have been on the table at least since 1993–4, when the Penghu-elected legislators approved an “offshore development act” that included a proposal to allow the establishment of casinos operated as joint ventures between reputable international casino firms and local businesses (Jou & Tsai, 2000). Some local investors readily purchased land and built hotels in anticipation of such a policy move. After various setbacks, it was only in 2009 that the Kuo-mintang (KMT) majority in Parliament secured the passage of a national law legalizing casino gambling but only on Taiwan’s outlying islands of Kinmen, Matsu and Penghu, and with the permission of residents, obtained through a referendum; the opposition Democratic People’s Party (DPP) legislators and other parties (comprising environmental and religious groups) voted against the bill, citing concerns about debt, crime and environmental degradation (Asian Gaming, 2009). The suggestion dawdled with plans to boost tourism on the islands, while containing the gambling industry to its small island precincts. Some politicians from the Penghu archipelago (including the county government), and businesspersons fronted by the Penghu Business Association, welcomed this proposed solution, saying that it would reinvigorate the island’s sluggish economy; and potential investors hailed Penghu as an emerging “Hawaii or Bahamas-style resort destination for the region” (Taipei Times, 2009c).

Other islanders, however, allied with university students and faith-based groups, opposed the plan on the grounds that it would damage the natural environment and undermine the social fabric of the residents (The China Post, 2009a, 2009b). In a referendum held on September 26, 2009, 56.4% of Penghu voters disagreed with the proposal, effectively scuttling the casino plan there. Voter turnout was 42.7%. Tellingly, the jubilant ‘Penghu Anti-casino Alliance’ held a press conference after the results of the referendum became known, in a Catholic Church hall; and Buddhist priests were amongst the leading anti-casino activists. It sounds rather trite that, in a study after the referendum result, one of the conclusions is that “… the relevant authorities should consider the attitudes of local residents when considering the gambling entertainment industry” (Tai & Shiue, 2010, p. 117).

Following this rejection on Penghu, Matsu and Kinmen islanders were next in line to vote in their own ‘casino referendum’ (The China Post, 2011; Taiwan Today, 2011b). Voters approved their casino in July 2012 (Taipei Times, 2012b); and Caesars Entertainment Corporation, a Las Vegas company, smelling an opportunity, has been “pursuing a licence for a casino on Kinmen” (Macau Business Daily, 2012). Meanwhile, Penghu county government is cooperating with the central government in Taipei to make the islands a green-energy and low-carbon archipelago, an initiative that is expected to become the special feature of Penghu’s economy. The fall back economic option for Penghu is to promote its natural and cultural assets for tourism. These features world-class volcanic landscapes, a rich ecosystem and historic sites, including the oldest temple in the country dedicated to Mazu, the Goddess believed to protect fishers at sea (Taipei Times, 2010b). The Basalt columns of Penghu isles have been recognized as of world-class Geopark potential (Brunnsden & Lin, 2010); and six isles in the archipelago have been designated as the Penghu Geopark by the local government in 2007 (Lin, 2008), and joined the central government supported Taiwan’s Geopark Network in 2011 (Council of Agriculture, 2011).

Discussion I: local-central vs. island-to-island networks

The manner and extent to which local-central politics is played out with regard to Taiwan’s offshore islands are significantly impacted by the jurisdictional capacity of local actors. Within Taiwan’s official suite of 121 islands (of which 20 are inhabited), levels of local autonomy range from nil (in the case of the uninhabited islands/military posts/scientific stations) to county government status (in the case of Kinmen, Matsu and Penghu), and various levels of governance in between. For decades, the outreach connection from each island group is has been channelled directly to and from Taipei or Kaoshuing (the southern port and second city of Taiwan) in political, economic and social terms. Not surprisingly, transportation links reflect power dynamics: there has hardly been any direct transportation between these island groups. However, things are changing: an ‘Islands Development Collaboration Platform’ set up by Kinmen, Penghu and Matsu was launched in 2011.
This unprecedented archipelagic alliance among Taiwan’s three county-level island governments is intended to facilitate cooperation in developing tourism and trade in the Taiwan Strait, and to strengthen the islands’ economic capacity and connections via direct, island-to-island exchanges. This turn is visually captured in the accompanying map on the IDCP website (see Map 2).

Moreover, in the three cases discussed above, various mechanisms for the projection of specific island futures can be discerned. Top-down national security and economic development interests have, or are likely to, connect and clash with local resident objections, health and social value concerns, and appeals to the rights of indigenous people, typically supported by ‘third sector’ organizations, ranging from temples and family shrines, to small businesses and environmental groups. What makes these dynamics interesting and insightful from a political geography perspective, however, is that they imply attempts at the excision, or enclaving, of domestic space by Taipei. In other words, these initiatives, in spite of their obvious differences, sought to construct a role and function on an offshore island that was not deemed appropriate for mainland Taiwan. There is no contradiction here: the Taiwanese government is strategically deploying the internal differentiation of the territory under its jurisdiction, recognizing it effectively as an “enforcement archipelago” (Mountz, 2011): a space where judicial offshoring can keep undesirable or suspicious elements—nuclear waste, gambling, a duty-free taxation regime—at bay, minimizing and containing their costs and downsides, but at the same time still reaping their associated benefits. Meanwhile, in Taiwan, the islanders’ own rights, their natural and cultural assets, and their legitimate interest to have a say in their own futures, has been increasingly recognized.

**Discussion II: archipelago tensions**

What about the analysis of these same multiplicities in the context of the nature of the polity of Taiwan as de facto archipelago? It is the geo-physically fragmented and unequally distributed nature of the Taiwanese state that more easily naturalizes and legitimates such a differential approach to development; whether Taipei driven or locally inspired; and whether by population, land area, political clout, economic heft. Indeed, Map 1 provides a visual rendition particularly of Kinmen and Matsu as geographic outliers of Taiwan, also given that they are both so much closer to the PRC. In their respect, there is clearly no sense of a safe “internal sea” (LaFlamme, 1983, p. 361), with “the waters surrounding its component islands as being within its boundaries” (Lewis, 1974, p. 138), as is often expected among the attributes of archipelagos.

Yet, this “centrifugal tendency” (LaFlamme, 1983, p. 361) also betrays a disposition towards horizontal, ‘island-to-island’ relations; connectivities that avoid, but may even threaten and destabilize, the still predominant but now increasingly challenged mainland/island dialectic in understanding Taiwan’s relations to its offshore lands and peoples. In the words of Stratford, Baldacchino, McMahon, Farbotko, and Harwood (2011, p. 118), the islands of/off Taiwan may have been too often conceived as “... separate from the very archipelagos they may occupy or constitute (as if the did not exist or had been rendered ghostly).” We have noted some evidence of such island-to-island conceptualizations so far: with, say, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu acting in concert, developing common positions, facing the central administration as one bloc. There is (so far) an absence of island-based political parties or movements: out of 209 registered political parties in Taiwan in 2011, not a single one has a primarily offshore island base and constituency (Ministry of the Interior, 2011). However, while the two main coalitions—the KMT-led blue alliance and the DPP-led green alliance—maintain strong voter support throughout Taiwan, they are not as well entrenched in the offshore islands. Local, island-based groups—such as patriarchal clans, chambers of commerce and farmer cooperatives—are very influential in local politics; and their elected representatives have the ear of the two major national alliances (Hsiao, 1994). Indeed, three minor parties—the New Party, the People First Party and Green Party—are making some inroads. In the January 2012 legislative elections, the Green Party, which has an anti-nuclear waste disposal, anti-casino, pro-wetland and pro-coastal zone protection agenda, did relatively well in both Lanyu and Penghu (Taiwan Environmental Information Center, 2012); while the New Party and People First Party both fared relatively well in both Kinmen and Matsu (Central Electoral Commission, 2012). Also, the Offshore Islands Development Acts were proposed by politicians from Kinmen, Penghu and Matsu—and supported by both the KMT and DPP—since 1995. The relations which matter, particularly in crafting development policy, may be shifting to more multifocal, archipelagic ones (Jou & Tsai, 2000). “For island scholars ... the archipelago is a conceptual tool too little drawn upon” (Stratford et al., 2011, p. 125); it is an idea that “easily lends itself to all sorts of re-territorializations” (Westphal, 2012, p. 390). For Taiwan, it has been an organizing principle that remains scantily invoked: not enough stories cut across. But the situation is changing.

**Conclusion**

Islandness is not simply a biophysical condition but a complex assemblage of expressions of identity that attaches to places that are smaller than continents and are completely surrounded by water. These topographical identifications include strongly charged and intuitive perceptions of what “the island” is and should be (its identity, history and character; its future) as well as its relationality and connectivity (typically to and with a looming and larger mainland). Islands are tense “emotional geographies” (Stratford, 2008) that flesh out our often implicit assumptions and understandings of ocean, sky and land; of flows and boundaries; of
edges and interiors; of isolation and access (Clark, 2004; DeLoughrey, 2004; Hay, 2006; Lowenthal, 2007; Royle, 2001). Whether crafted by nature, built by people, or falling somewhere in between, as in Utopia (More, 1516/2002), islands are ambivalent spaces that highlight our fears and give vent to creative, sometimes dark, expressions of power and sovereignty. Their perceived smallness and ‘in betweenness’ (Baldacchino, 2008) increases the likelihood that they be construed as project sites and planning targets. All the more so by a ubiquitous, unitary, bureaucratic and security-driven, industrializing state with a, still fresh, authoritarian past like Taiwan (Cumings, 1984).

Locals may now dare to differ. Just as Taiwan was experiencing its first steps as a democratic state, it was also experimenting with differential governance: indeed, after 1987, the Kinmen and Matsu island groups only were kept under martial law governed by a special War Zone Administration Committee (WZAC), until 1992. Since then, Taiwan has struggled with competing notions of the island topos: nuclear waste dumping sites and gambling locales; but also high security prisons, parks, reserves, tourism attractions and associated product brands, missile practice targets, scientific stations and military outposts. The Taiwanese experience confirms and illustrates how spatiality, and islandness in particular, needs to be foregrounded within the current conceptualizations of development.

Of course, it would be naive to assume that the strategy for the offshore islands on the part of Taipei has been the outcome of a carefully thought-out development policy; just as much as the actions to such a vision have been coherent and consistent. Democratic governance is messy, and the representations implicit in different development trajectories – whether crafted top-down or island-to-island – are multiple, unrefined and in flux. In this paper, we have tried to avoid the serious pitfalls of such a singularity. We are also wary of archipelagic essentiality: there are competing visions and voices within the government in Taipei, as much as within the populations of the offshore islands, and within other organizations and associations. What emerged from the pluri-vocality surrounding both the casino and nuclear waste episodes is a diverse coalition of concerns – often uniting specific metropolitan with specific island (and aboriginal) interests – who shared a common goal in blocking the intentions of central government. The rich diversity that is celebrated in Taiwan’s island biology, geology and culture now extends beyond, and pertains also to the slate of representations about its islands’ presumed functions, development trajectories and imagined sustainable futures.

With further improvements of late in the relationship between Taipei and Beijing (Asia News, 2013; BBC News, 2012), Taiwan’s islands may benefit handsomely from an influx of tourists from the world’s most populous country. For example, as from 2008, guided group tours started being allowed from mainland China to Taiwan; and from June 2011, 500 Chinese tourists from Beijing, Shanghai and Xiamen are being allowed to enter Taiwan every day (Sui, 2011). In the process, Taiwan’s offshore islands can expect a new round of status adjustments; a new conceptualization of what it means to be “on the edge” (Berry & Lu, 2005), or even at the centre. Perhaps the focus for a future round of a keenly contested metageography will lie in determining what kinds of tourism development are most suitable for Taiwan’s offshore spaces and their residents. Such policies are to be based on the (vague and potentially contradictory) principles of sustainable development that seek to “boost their industrial development, protect their natural ecological environment, conserve their cultural features, enhance their quality of life and improve the welfare of their residents” (Offshore Island Development Fund Management Committee, 2005: Para. 1).

In the lingering power play between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China/Taiwan, the latter has, since 1972, been unable to represent itself in the United Nations and its affiliate organizations. With some thawing of Taiwan Strait relations of late, however, Beijing has been less obdurate: Taiwan has been ‘allowed’ to participate in a few international agencies, such as the International Olympic Committee, the World Health Organization, and the World Trade Organization, but under the name of either ‘Chinese Taipei’ or as the ‘Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu’ (WTO, 2013). It is somewhat prescient that such “compromise” nomenclatures (Xu, 2006, p. 103) – only accepted begrudgingly by the Taiwanese authorities – are so far the only examples of a semi-official recognition of Taiwan’s de facto archipelagic identity. This identity presumably lends itself as a constructive component of ongoing efforts at Taiwanization that go beyond orchestrated moves towards de-Sinicification (Li, 2013, p. 134).

Meanwhile, archipelagos remain a less examined metageography. With the Bahamas in mind, Bethel (2000, p. 2) opines that “[t]itle has been written about the effects of geography on archipelagic nations”. Thinking with the archipelago can change how we think about the world and our place in it (Pugh, 2013). These include visions of inbordering and enclosing. Such a ‘turn’ foregrounds more fluid tropes of assemblages, mobilities and multiplicities associated with island—island movements (Tsai, 2003). We contend that the plurality of an archipelago can be elusive; it may not easily lend itself to control and profiling; it may not settle submissively into tight historical, cultural or discursive compartments; it could defy coordination and organization; and it would tend to express itself via a cacophony of voices, aspirations, identities and histories that clash with the ‘official’, smart logo, brand, official identity and history of a pluri-island group (Baldacchino & Ferreira, 2013). “Each island, however small, tends to have a distinct history, certain unique cultural characteristics, and often its own language or dialect” (Hamilton-Jones, 1992, p. 200); and many more differences than these tend to lurk and linger in island–island tensions (LaFlamme, 1983; Stratford et al., 2011). The unfolding politics of Taiwan is now a better reflection, and a stronger acknowledgement, of a long subdued, and differently uneven, geographical plurality; a plurality that, however, is acknowledged quite matter-of-factly in such unofficial documents as Wikipedia: This new constitutional government moved to Taipei, Taiwan in 1949 because of its military losses in the Chinese Civil War. It remains in Taiwan and exercises control over other islands including Penghu, Quemoy, Matsu, Itu Aba, and Pratas (Wikipedia, 2013; underlines refer to hyperlinks in the original).

Taiwan is but one example where the obvious may not be stated; consider, for example, the analysis of the United Kingdom as “an Atlantic archipelago” (Pocock, 2005, p. 29); of Australia’s shifting identity as island, continent, nation and archipelago (Perera, 2009); and of the consciousness of the Japanese state as a Shimaguni (island nation) and its possible bearing on how it tackles the escalating tensions in the China Sea (Suwa, 2012). Similar ontologies, with their own (re)constructions of geo-politics, may also be profitably deployed on for other archipelagos, which are more “terribly common” (Bethel, 2000, p. 2) than one might think.

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